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SAVING Us FROM OURSELVES: THE
INTERACTION OF LAW AND
SCIENCE -TECHNOLOGY*
By JAMES W. CURLIN
INTRODUCTION

M
L

UCH of the furor about technology centers around the morality of
focusing on profit margins and thereby permitting external costs

to be transferred to the society in general, without the informed consent
of those who must finally bear the cost. This internal assessment, even
in this period of manifest social concern, emphasizes the calculus of the
'economic cost-benefit ratio," with little concern for the consequential
damages hidden in the external "social cost-social benefit ratio."' It is
these societal costs which disrupt social order and undermine political
and judicial stability. One of the best (and perhaps most overused)
examples of technology as an agent of social disruption is the automobile. It is blamed for changes in social mores, for occasioning the
death of the downtown core-city, and the rise of the suburb. Most of
the social impacts registered by the automobile were, I am sure, neither
intended by Henry Ford, nor were most of them even foreseeable,
given the state of knowledge that existed in the early 1900s.
Clearly, to fully appreciate the problems posed by the introduction
of technological innovations, such as the automobile into society, one
must look behind the decision theory used to evaluate the suitability
of a product or service for the public market.
I.

LEGAL PROCESS AND SCIENCE-TECHNOLOGY

Change brought about by technology must be managed in such a
way as to minimize the adverse effects prospectively, before harm
accrues. 2 Thus, maintenance of social stability against the impact of
*This work supported by the National Science Foundation under NSF Interagency Agreement No. AAA-R-4-79.
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960); see also Nutter,
Coase Theorem on Social Cost: A Footnote, 11 J. LAW & ECON. 503 (1968). Economists
call these costs "external diseconomies," which are defined as: a generally nonpurposeful
byproduct of producing one commodity which raises the monetary cost of producing or
consuming another commodity.
2 The process of identifying the second-order effects of technology is called "technology
assessment." The definition seems to have assumed sufficient breadth to include implementation of social control, as well as the scientific and engineering approaches to
identification of second-order effects: "The concept of 'technology assessment' represents
an attempt to understand and appraise the results of technological progress in order to
allow the development of policies for the rational application of technology." Technology
Assessment at v (R. Kasper ed. July 1969, Proceedings of a Seminar Series at George
Washington University).
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science-technology requires that we identify and promote, along with
the primary beneficial consequences, the desirable second-order consequences; and reduce to a practical minimum those second-order
3
consequences that are unintended, unanticipated, and undesirable.
Three social institutions presently serve ad hoc roles in technology
assessment: (1) market; (2) courts; and (3) legislatures.4 Generally,
the market has failed to give any indication of being a viable assessment agency. The public persists in demanding consumer goods with
little concern for inherent dangers or longrange hazards; moreover, the
public seems unwilling to pay higher consumer prices to abate the
hazards. Failure of the market in its assessment role is attributable
partially to the consumer's failure to recognize potential hazards and
secondary consequences, and partially to an unconscious awareness that
the social costs (external diseconomies) fall upon the general public
and therefore do not directly affect the specific group or person who
purchases the fruits of the technology.' A unique exception to this
statement is liability insurance which in some ways tends to soften the
effect of one of the inherent secondary consequences by spreading the
cost of potential risks over a series of periodic payments and limiting
these costs to the specific consumer group. It also serves as market
assessor of technology. Premium rates reflect the insurance companies'
willingness to assume the risks for the activity; therefore, if premiums
are excessive or if the risks are so great that insurance is not available
for the activity, it will operate to encourage an assessment of the factors
causing the high risk.'
Courts have traditionally served as the primary instrumentality for
internalizing the social costs resulting from socially irresponsible acts.
Through the application of common law tort doctrines, the judiciary
redistributes the social cost by placing financial liability upon those
responsible for the injury, thus, it operates directly upon the incidents
of costs. 7 The effectiveness of common law doctrines as instrumentalities of technology assessment has waivered with the laws' reflection
6 (1969).
Technology Assessment and the Law: Introduction and Perspective, 36 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1035-37 (1968).
5 Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968); The process of
transferring social costs to the general public is described by Hardin in an analogy to
the use of the Common by herdsmen. By placing one additional animal in the Common,
a herdsman will gain the productivity of one animal, and because the cost for the
production of this additional animal is distributed among all of the herdsmen of the
Common, the socially irresponsible herdsman always gains more than it costs him as an
individual. The tragedy of the Commons occurs, of course, when the herd exceeds the
carrying capacity of the range.
6 James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L. J.
549 (1948).
7 Katz. The Function of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment, 38 U. CIN. L. REV. 587
(1969); Portnoy, The Role of the Courts in Technology Assessment. 55 CORNELL L.
REV. 861 (1969).
3 R. BAUER, SECOND-ORDER CONSEQUENCES

4 Green,
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of societal attitudes toward technology. The strict liability doctrine of
Rylands v. Fletcher8 gave way to less harsh nuisance doctrines, which
required a showing of negligence, when the economic benefits of a
rapidly expanding laissez-faire industrial society were realized at the
turn of the century. As a result of recent public concern for environmental problems, nuisance doctrines are presently showing a trend back
toward a position closer to strict liability.
A contemporary example of the role of common law as a force
in technology assessment is demonstrated by the dynamic law of products
liability. The grounds upon which manufacturers of automobiles will
be found liable for design defects have been expanded from negligence
to breach of implied warranty, and strict tort liability. There is neither
data available to ascertain the financial impact which design suits have
had on the industry, nor is it possible to evaluate the role of judicial
process as a public mechanism to control automobile design, but greater
public awareness of design litigation heightens the possibility that the
corporate conscience will respond.'
Evolution of common law doctrines is extremely slow by modern
standards, and as we shall see later on, technology has a tendency to
out-pace its assessor. Furthermore, the chronic, insidious damage emanating from modern technology mocks traditional doctrines which
require showing of harm and proximate causation. Finally, standards
established by courts on the basis of cases and conflicts presuppose that
the harm is already done - "Law is the articulation of the answers of
yesteryear.""°
In the legislative arena there evolves a merger of law and politics.
This interaction between demonstrative public concern (politics) and
judicial doctrines results in statutes and achninistrative regulations
predicated upon, at least in theory, the balance of social benefits and
social risks.
Legislative process does not require the presentation of a case or
conflict for statutory enactment, thus it may be applied prospectively
in anticipation of a societal problem. This fact coupled with the fact
that most statutory law is applied by administrative agencies, provides
flexibility and makes legislation seemingly the most effective vehicle
for technology assessment presently available.
Notwithstanding the legislature's unique capability to implement
legal process to protect the health, morals, safety, and general welfare
of the public, it too fails as an assessment institution. In most cases,
legislatures like courts, act after the fact. Seldom does a preliminary
8

L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).

9 Nader & Page, Automobile Design and Judicial Process, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 645 (1967).
10 Miller, Science vs. Law: Some Legal Problems Raised by "Big Science." 17 BUFFALO L.
REV. 591, 593 (1968).
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assessment of technology motivate the legislature to enact legislation;
it is only after an obvious social problem arises and the issue becomes
politicized that legislative action is taken. There is often a lag between
identification of a social problem and its legislative solution in order
for the public to become concerned enough about the problem to generate the political response needed to overcome legislative inertia. More
telling is the fact that legislatures are structured for the mechanics of
making laws of generality with which to deal with broad social problems; they are not equipped to handle the specificity required to
evaluate the second-order effects of science-technology. If the market,
the courts, and the legislatures are unable to adequately fulfill this task
of technology assessment, how can it be done?
II.

THE NEED FOR NEW INSTITUTIONS

The present federal agency structure divides the responsibility for
science-technology assessment among numerous agencies, each limited
by well-defined mission boundaries. No single governmental agency
now possesses the broad authority or resources needed to evaluate the
problems of science-technology in the broad context of its potential
impact on the social and physical environment. A cursory look at some
of the current problems which have been the result of technological
innovation should serve as a substantial impetus in driving lawyers,
scientists, politicians, and educators to press for a new institutional arm.
During the last 20 years computing technology has developed
from highly specialized scientific application to general use. Considering the basic question of admissibility of computer output as evidence,
the fact that records in machine language cannot be read directly by
the court raises a potential problem with the hearsay rule. Courts have
thus far fitted computer printouts into the business records exemptions
of the hearsay rule although such records are intrinsically secondary
evidence." Questions concerning the availability of computer records
have also arisen in application of discovery efforts in rules of procedure. 2 Additionally, computer softare inventions present new and
unique problems of protecting this kind of intellectual and industrial
3
property under the established system of copyright law.'
One can speculate on the far-reaching impacts that mechanical
innovations might have on society, and consequently the potential
a1 Lowman, Evidence: The Admissibility Of Computer Print-Outs In Kansas, 8 WASHBURN
L. J. 332 (1969); see Transport Indemnity Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253, 132 N.W. 20d 871
(1965); cf. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Knox Homes Corp., 343 F.2nd 887 (5th
Cir. 1965).
12 Local 743, IAM v. United Aircraft Corp., 220 F. Supp. 19 (D.C. Conn. 1963), aff'd
337 F.2d 5 (2nd Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 908 (1965).
3 Koller, Computer Software Protection: Report of an Institute Clinic, 13 IDEA 351
(1969).
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interaction with law as both a remedial tool and regulatory mechanism.
But the more difficult problems will be those created by biological
innovations. Professor Rene Dubos has observed that "the ethical
issues created by modern biology [originate] from the necessitated
course of two complementary aspects of human life: the right of the
individual person, and the needs of the community from which he
derives his physical and mental sustenance."' 4 The balancing of personal freedom against societal interest is not a new challenge to legal
process; but biomedical technology impinges upon sanctum sanctorums
-the body, the mind, and the family. The conflict is with what one
might consider a vested personal right to reap the benefits of biomedical science and the secondary consequences that broad scale application
of such a vested right might have on society.
Consider both the recent application of biomedical innovations in
human tissue transplantations, and the issue of artificial insemination.
There can be no heart transplant until the donor has achieved a total
state of death unless medicine commits murder. This leads directly to
medical and ethical problems concerning: What is death? How is death
defined? What is the difference between legal death and medical
death? Exactly when does death occur so that a donation may be
made?" 5 Correlative legal technicalities associated with tissue transplantation are: Who has the right to determine whose heart will be
used for a transplant? Can a prospective donor determine the use of
his organs before he dies? If so, how long in advance of death need
this decision be made? Can a surviving spouse or heirs of a decedent
make this decision? What happens in the event that the decedent and
his survivors have different ideas about what should be done with his
remains? Who owns the cadaver? A short time ago the term "death"
had a single meaning which was capable of definition. Now, in the
light of current medical reality and the need for prompt removal of
organs for transplantation, the moment of death is less capable of
definition. There is the most extreme state of death: cytological death,
meaning extinction of every living cell. There is physiological death,
meaning cessation of vital functions. There is intellectual death, the
inability to synthesize or assimilate knowledge. And there is also spiritual death, theological death, and social death."
Similarly, the introduction of artificial insemination by donors as
an alternative for marriage partners suffering from male sterility has
had an unsettling effect on some familial relationships. Courts have been
asked to decide on the legitimacy of offspring conceived in such man14Seminar, The New Biology and the Law, 2 U. FLA. L. REV. 427, 431 (1969).
15 Wechter

& Aranson, Medical-Legal Ramifications of Human Tissue Transplantation,

18 DEPAUL L. REV. 488, 489 (1969).
16 Seminar,

supra note 14, at 435.
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ner, whether insemination is tantamount to adultery, and the inheritance
rights of the offspring.1 7
The resolution of these problems must finally evolve from the
collaborative thinking of scientists, physicians, lawyers, theologians, and
philosophers. Biochemical developments on the horizon will raise more
complex questions.
At this point one must distinguish science from technology, for
it is this distinction wherein part of the root of the problem lies.
Technology is applied science. 8 Therefore, the gestation period between
the evolution of scientific discovery and the development into a marketable technology is a potential period of intellectual introspection, during
which research, debate, and speculation about the potential problems
of applying the fruits of the discovery can develop. Time lags between
scientific discovery and technological application continue to get
shorter (Table 1.)."9 Ways are constantly being sought to reduce the

technological lag because of obvious economic implications. 20 This
period of lead time is precious for in-depth assessment, yet it will
continue to be shortened to its minimum practical limit by the
technologists.
TABLE 1.
Time Lag Between Product Discovery and Application
Innovation

Year of
Discovery

Year of
Application

Electric Motor

1821

1886

Vacuum Tube

1882

1915

Radio Broadcasting
X-ray Tubes
Nuclear Reactor
Radar
Atomic Bomb
Transistor
Solar Battery
Stereospecific Rubbers & Plastics

1887
1895
1932
1935
1938
1948
1953
1955

1922
1913
1942
1940
1945
1951
1955
1958

Ad hoc
and private
lag between
trols." The

assessment of technology by the traditional governmental
institutions discussed above involves a significant time
recognition of the problem and implementation of conmomentum of science and technology, coupled with

17 Guttmacher, Artificial Insemination, 18 DEPAUL L. REV. 566 (1969).
905 (1969).

18 WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY

19 Wolfbein, Pace of Technological Change and Factors Affecting It 19 (paper presented
at the North American Regional Conference on Manpower Implications of Automation,
Wash.. D. C., Dec. 1964).
20 PREHODA, DESIGNING THE FUTURE 89 (1967).
Legislative View, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1044,
21 Daddario, Technology Assessment -A
1049-50 (1968).
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potential harm which modern developments can suffer upon society,
mitigates against the ad hoc approach to technology assessment. A
number of alternative institutions have been proposed to serve the
necessary governmental functions.22 There is a diversity of opinion as
to the specific role such an institution should play in regulation of
technology, the mechanics of implementation and to whom it should
answer, but it is generally agreed that the assessment institution must
have a significant research component at its disposal.2 3 To be effective
the assessment institution must be staffed heavily by natural scientists
and engineers, with a significant complement of social scientists to
consider the economic, behavioral and political ramifications. Whatever form the institution takes, it must be innovative in its approach
to assessment. By definition, it must be broadly multidisciplinary and
structured to maximize the interaction among specialists. It will be
unique enough among science-technology institutions in that no exact
24
prototype exists today.

III.

THE LAWYER AND LEGAL PROCESS IN
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

It is implicit from the foregoing that the legal process p!ays an
important role in technology assessment; but just what is that role?
I must disagree with Chief Justice Burger in his view that "[tjhe
law's assignment in society is not one to anticipate needs. The law
responds after a problem arises, and that is as it should be. ' 2 5 I prefer
to adopt the thesis that law, being normative in nature, must also be
expanded to include law that is goal-seeking; in short, it must be
neutral; it must be "result" or "future oriented.'' 26 This implies a
responsive, dynamic law-a law which participates at all stages of
the science-technology assessment process. Given this position on the
scope of the law, exactly what is the lawyer's role, and when does he
enter into the assessment procedure? Although the lawyer is not uniquely
vested with infinite wisdom to formulate the proper question, legal
22NATIONAL

ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, 91ST CONG., 2D SESS., TECHNOLOGY: PROCESS OF
AND CHOICE (House Comm. on Science & Astronautics, Comm. Print
1969); COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ENGINEERING POLICY, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, 91st CONG., 2d SESS., A STUDY OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (House Comm.

ASSESSMENT

on Science & Astronautics, Comm. Print 1969); Ecological Society of America, National
Institute of Ecology: An Inquiry? (March 25, 1970); ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES BOARD,
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCESTIONS FOR EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, INSTITUOF THE ENVIRONMENT, pt. 1 (1970).

23 Kiefer, Technology Assessment, CHEMICAL AND ENGINEERING NEWS, Oct. 5, 1970, at 42.
24 AD Hoc NEL CONCEPT COMMITTEE, OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY, 91ST CONG.,

2d SESS.,

THE CASE FOR NATIONAL

ENVIRONMENTAL

LABORATORIES

15-16

(Senate

Comm. on Public Works, Comm. Print 1970).
2 Seminar, The New Biology and The Law, 21 U. FLA. L. REV. 427, 433 (1969).
26 Miller. Science vs. law: Some Legal Problems Raised by "Big Science," 17 BUFFALO
L. RtEV. 593, 602 (1968).
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training does sensitize one to social problems and humanistic values
which must be considered before the questions are posed. This is
essential since once cannot get correct answers without first posing
the correct questions.2 7 The importance of posing the proper questions
in technology assessment assumes perspective if you consider the
queries: How much noise can a human tolerate, compared to, how
noiseless can the machine reasonably be made? I suggest that you
would arrive at widely divergent answers from assessment of the
same technology merely by approaching the problem from contrasting
positions posed by the two questions.
The lawyer's role is better defined later in the assessment process
when the attributes of the technology are known and appropriate
control is being considered to protect basic individual rights. Implementation of control should remain in the hands of the legislature
to weigh the facts against public policy considerations. How the technical data and alternatives are presented to the legislative body, and
the procedural aspects of the policy formation are both aspects of the
process which will rely heavily on the legal profession.
It has been suggested that the weighing of public risks (costs)
versus public benefits cannot be entrusted to an elite group, a panel
or board acting ex cathedra; but rather the public itself must express
its views through its elected representatives in the democratic process.
How then is the information communicated simultaneously to the
public and the legislature to begin policy formulation? Professor
Harold P. Green suggests that the adversary process offers a potent
vehicle "to compel scientists and technologists to present the issues
to the public in the language of ordinary public discourse rather than
in the esoteric jargon of their disciplines." '
An adversary procedure would give equal time and attention to
the negative factors of technology as well as the positive factors emphasized by the vested interests. This approach is not without its detractors
however. Discussion concerning the application of the adversary process
to information transfer within a technology assessment institution
invariably reveals an aversion among scientists to participate in a
procedure which centers upon advocacy.2 9 Most scientists would apparently opt for an "objective institution" as opposed to an "adversary
institution," thereby failing to recognize that advocacy can also be
objective-like in its final result.
27

28

See Estate of Rogers v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 410

(1943).

"In law also the right

answer usually depends on putting the right question." Id. at 413.
See SUBCOMM. ON SCIENCE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE
AND ASTRONAUTICS, 91ST CONG., 1ST SESS., TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 175 (Comm.

Print No. 13, 1969).
29 Kasper, supra note 2, at 79.
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IV.

PROBLEMS OF COMMUNICATION

The behavioral divergence with regard to advocacy is but one
of the attitudinal impediments which must be overcome between
scientists and lawyers in a multidisciplinary effort such as technology
assessment. Another equally important problem is: How do we
structure an institution capable of handling the complex task of creating
a highly interactive, multidisciplinary organization which I discussed
above? It is implicit that there must be the intellectual capacity to staff
such an institution. Earlier I mentioned the apparent attitudinal differences between scientist-engineers and lawyers; since communication
among the disciplines is the key to an effective assessment institution,
it is beneficial to look at some of the differences between the professions. Scientific method involves the formulation of theories by inductive
logic gained from empirical observations, which are then tested by
experimentation, reformulated, tested again and verified. The output
is reputed to be arrived at scientifically, ergo "dispassionately," "objectively," and "unbiased." The "logico-inductive" process is the backbone
of science; the facts and theories thus derived must survive a period
of critical study and testing by other competent and disinterested
individuals, and must be found so persuasive that they are almost
universally accepted. John Ziman observed in a comparison of science
and nonscience, that:
We all feel that legal thought is quite different from scientific
thought - but what is the basis of this intuition? There are many ways
in which legal argument is very close to Science. . . . To the extent
• . . that the Law is strictly logical, it can be made "scientific" .. . .
But, of course, in Science, when the evidence is conflicting, we withhold our assent or dissent, and do the experiment again. This cannot

be done in legal disputes, which must be terminated yea or nay ...
The Law is thus unscientific because it must decide upon matters which
are not at all amenable to a consensus opinion. 30

A most important philosophical distinction between science and
law is the power to discriminate between what is consensible and public
in a scientific sense, and what is not. The frustrations of a lawyer are
understandable when his scientist-colleague refuses to make categorical
statements concerning factual observations. Science depends heavily
upon statistical inference to create the consensual acceptance of proven
theories. Physics represents, perhaps, the "purest" of science; it is
deterministic and can be reduced to mathematical terms with high
predictability. Statistical probabilities associated with many experiments
in the physical sciences will exceed 99 percent, the difference between
prediction and perfection being due to random experimental error.
Biological and behavioral sciences, on the other hand, have low probabilities associated with their predictability, and must, therefore, depend
30

J. ZIMAN, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE 13, 15 (1968).
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heavily on statistical inference. The natural systems with which we
are compelled to work in environmental and sociological studies are
characteristically variable; thus, observations made thereon are less
reliable. Predictions under those circumstances are considered quite
good if they are correct 60 percent of the time. The point being that
science measures the value of a theory by the ability to reproduce
results with sufficient predictability to elicit a consensus of agreement
among professional colleagues. The tendency is to make further observation and experiments to improve the reliability of the prediction so
as to persuade other people to agree to the consensus.
Our first care in Science, is to preserve the consensus from unwitting error; what is certain must be clearly delineated from what is
conjectured; the continuous incorporation of merely probable results
must inevitably lead to a degradation of the credibility of the whole
31

scientific enterprise.
Law deals with normative principles and moral issues which are
quite outside of science. The business of law cannot be consensual in
the same respect as science. "Science cannot tell us what ought to be
32
done; it can only chart the consequences of what might be done.
Recognition of these distinctive and complementary roles of law and
science reinforces the argument for developing a close alliance between
the disciplines.
Certainly the Gestalt of law tends to conflict philosophically with
the rigid "logico-inductive" processes of science, thus resulting in
barriers to effective communications between the practitioners. To keep
this communication problem in perspective, however, it is well to note
that similar information impedances exist within the natural sciences.
Common use of the scientific method has failed to bridge the communication barrier among scientific disciplines. It would seem that
disparate logic is not the cause of breakdowns in communicationthe cause is segregation of the disciplines. Institutions are traditionally
organized on a disciplinary basis; physicists are housed in a department
of physics; biologists are sequestered in a department of biology;
lawyers are in a legal department. Each becomes highly proficient in
intradepartmental communication; specialized languages develop, disciplinary logic becomes standardized, and a semifraternal atmosphere
may persist. There may even be institutional policies which encourage
the interaction among departments, but generally these efforts fail to
result in meaningful cooperation because of insistence that disciplinary
bonds be maintained. Occasionally individuals will overcome the
inertia of the discipline-oriented system and develop professional relationships with colleagues from other departments. When spatial
3

1Id. at 44.
Id.at 15.

32

1970

SAVING US FROM OURSELVES

problems are overcome and the disciplines are brought to focus on a
common problem, there is an interim period required for the group
to adjust to jargon and philosophies. Only after the semantics are in
order can truly effective communications result among the disciplines.
There has been little notable interaction between lawyers and
scientists, or between natural scientists and behavioral scientists. Part
of the problem has been the failure of scientists to recognize the
relevance of law or sociology to what they consider to be scientific
matters. 3 In most organizations the legal department's function is
primarily administrative; it handles the commercial aspects of doing
science-technology business, e.g., contracting, patent work, and
employee relations. It is not staffed for intellectual or academic pursuits.
Most scientists never come in contact with lawyers in their normal
course of business, and those that do often consider lawyers as technicians concerned with picayunish, esoteric details. We are dealing
here with disciplines quite unaccustomed to talking with each other.
Given the basic differences in logic and methodology between
law and science-technology, how can the universities better prepare
scientists and lawyers to cope with problems of interdisciplinary communication? Formal education has a pervasive influence on the attitudes
and philosophies one brings into his profession. In the past, universities
have imbued students with acceptance of the separatist, disciplinary
approach to problem solution. Recent trends in higher education indicate a recognition of the viability of the interdisciplinary approach
leading to the establishment of interdisciplinary curricula. Today's
students seem to realize that satisfactory solutions of the most important
problems facing society can come only from the coordinated efforts
of natural science, behavioral science, and law. The activism which
permeates the campus has resulted in extracurricular student organizations being formed to attack social problems such as environmental
pollution, racial discrimination, and consumer exploitation. These
external activities fill a void which exists in the traditional educational
structure. In some respects they are a monument to the failure of higher
education to provide the "relevance" being sought by today's youth.
An interesting feature of these extracurricular activities is that they
achieve the necessary interdisciplinary approach to the social problem
because they are unstructured to the extent that the resources are
matched to the needs of the problem rather than the problem being
narrowed in definition to fit the resources of a discipline. In other
words, if the problem identified for attack is one involving, say, the
pollution of an estuary, the unstructured student organization is free
to seek voluntary contributions of knowledge from any willing disciplinary source available, be they in engineering, ecology, sociology, or
33Miler, supra note 26, at 597.
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law. It is unlikely that the student group would ever consider restricting
the definition of the problem to conform to the capabilities and
resources of a single discipline. I cite these external student activities
only as evidence that the new generation of science and law students
recognizes the need for dialogue among the disciplines, and that
through their extracurricular activities they are developing additional
communication skills which will carry over into their professional
careers. The educational institutions have responded to the student
concern with new innovative cross-disciplinary courses and seminar
series designed to improve communication and understanding. Another
encouraging manifestation of the coming age of interdisciplinary concern is the large number of students crossing disciplines for graduate
training. The results of this phenomenon may produce a "hybrid
vigor," with the emergence of new substantive professional fields yet
undefined.
Thus far I have dealt primarily with institutional deficiencies and
personal rapport which tends to mitigate against effective interdisciplinary team research. The communication gap also extends to the
literature. Science-technology has depended upon the written word to
create the consensus required for acceptance of scientific theory.
Science articles are generally written in the dispassionate, third-person
language of the peer group. This mode of communication is persuasive
and effective for those versed in the subject matter and familiar with
the jargon. Lawyers write in the same manner for consumption by the
bar. This is as it must be. But there is also a responsibility sub silento
to inform those in other disciplines of the trends and concerns in one's
subject area. This task has been largely assumed by journalists, with
the result being that the information is filtered for content by one who
is versed in neither discipline. I suspect that more law is read in
magazines like Time or Newsweek by scientists, and more knowledge
about science is gleaned from the same magazines by lawyers, than
from any other source. To keep abreast of even a single narrow field
of science, a person must seek his material from a score of specialty
journals. In broad fields of interest like environmental affairs, one
must consult an unmanageable number of periodicals from widely
diverse disciplines to remain informed of the important developments.
There are few interdisciplinary periodicals which summarize the
research of a problem area; most are intended for publication of
research resulting from the activities of members of the sponsoring
discipline.
Legal periodicals are equally inaccessible to scientists-technologists.
Law reviews, incidentally, serve an important function in assessment
of science-technology. As the intellectual sounding boards of the legal
profession, law review articles are often the first to identify and
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analyze the legal, moral, and societal dangers associated with a new
technological or scientific development. The usefulness of the law review
for legal analysis of problems associated with science-technology could
be enhanced even more by a conscious effort on the part of the editorial
staffs to identify sensitive areas of developing science so that perceptive,
imaginative analyses of potential legal problems could be made in
advance of the release of technology to the public. The copyright policy
of most law reviews, however, limit their dissemination within the
scientific community, and thus reduce their effectiveness as a feedback
mechanism to the scientist.
Cross-publication by professional counterparts in both legal and
scientific periodicals could improve information exchange by making
the pertinent literature more easily available to the other discipline,
and by compelling the contributor to translate disciplinary information
into an understandable form.
Comprehensive key-word abstracting systems would also facilitate
information exchange across disciplinary boundaries. The inclusion of
scientific and legal titles within the same retrieval system would
enhance the usefulness of the system to both disciplines. The use of
key words, common to both legal and technical material, would insure
retrieval of all pertinent information regardless of disciplinary origin.
Specialized curricula have been developed at many law schools
to meet the need of specific problems confronting the legal process.
These new areas of developing law are fascinating and capture the
imagination of the creative student. But just as legal educators have
come to realize the value of legal clinics in the training of practitioners,
so must they consider the development of clinical programs and
internships for those planning a career in dealing with the legal problems of science-technology. A summer spent in association with scientists and engineers at a large laboratory or within an institute or agency
dealing with science problems could be most beneficial for both law
students and scientists.
Continuing education should also incorporate interdisciplinary
programs of instruction for the bar and scientist-technologist alike.
Joint symposia should be developed to discuss specific mutual problems
among scientists and lawyers. Cross-participation in professional meetings of both disciplines would serve as effective forums for confrontation between the disciplines. Scientists have also come to realize the
importance of legal processes in achieving harmony between sciencetechnology and society. Law will become more attractive for graduate
study to the new generation of socially aware scientists. Educators may
expect to see more students with backgrounds in science-technology
enrolled in law schools in the future.

